Project Contingent Repudiation Risk in the Model of North-South Lending by Gurdgiev, Constantin T.
 
 
 
 
Project Contingent Repudiation Risk 
in the Model of North-South Lending. 
 
Constantin T. Gurdgiev 
Department of Economics 
Trinity College, Dublin 
Department of Economics, 
National University of Ireland, Maynooth 
 
Open Republic Institute, Dublin. 
 
 
gurdgiec@tcd.ie 
 
1st Draft: April 2002. 
2nd Draft: August 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. 
 
Present research proposes the extension of the Gertler-Rogoff-Lane model of 
international lending under the risk of repudiation with moral hazard to encompass the 
possibility of the project contingency in the repudiation risk itself. By linking the level of 
repudiation risk to the size of the project we show that investment projects undertaken 
can be biased in a direction favouring larger projects. Alternatively, we show that smaller 
investors are required in the marketplace, under certain conditions, to provide greater 
guarantees or higher collateral in order to obtain funds needed for investment. 
 
 
 
Introduction. 
 
In recent years, the role of risk and in particular repudiation risk as a determinant of 
investment decisions and capital flows has been highlighted by a plethora of models. At 
the same time, traditional models of repudiation risk have invariably avoided 
endogenising the risk-project relationship outside the general framework of the moral 
hazard and agency problems. Yet, with development of democratic institutions and the 
opening of national boundaries to trade and capital flows, information flows have come 
to the forefront of the real investment projects assessment with respect to both the 
inherent risk involved and the role that the nature of the project plays within the 
constraints of such institutions on the level of overall risk.  
 
While the former aspect of the repudiation risk is covered extensively in the existing 
literature, the latter remains largely unexplored. Yet as the result of these different facets 
of the same phenomena, both the inherent risk of the investments and the repudiation risk 
in particular are often endogenous to the environment of the project. Another aspect 
worth considering is the relationship between the project characteristics, such as size, and 
the overall availability of information. In the societies with developed democratic 
institutions, such as courts, media and political campaigning, larger projects enjoy greater 
public visibility and electoral scrutiny. Thus such projects may be naturally associated 
with the lower repudiation risk. On the other hand, in the societies with severe degrees of 
market distortions and corruption, large projects may be associated with government 
involvement and thus may be linked to a higher degree of repudiation risk. In what 
follows, we term these effects project-contingent nature of repudiation risk and for the 
sake of brevity deal with the first type of relationship between the nature of the project 
and the inherent level of risk involved.  
 
The majority of repudiation risk literature focuses on the open economy side of the 
macroeconomic models, while the larger share of moral hazard models is concerned with 
the closed economies. For example, the seminal paper by Gertler and Rogoff develops a 
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model of investment under uncertainty in the presence of moral hazard that ignores the 
possibility of repudiation risk. As such, this model, according to authors’ admission, 
cannot be used to distinguish investment flows between two states within the US and the 
two sovereign countries. Lane (1998, 1999) extension introducing repudiation risk moves 
this model into the open economy macroeconomics, while leaving the consideration of 
project-specificity of risk not addressed. Similarly, an important paper by Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1998) focuses on the closed economy aspect of agency risk without providing an 
analysis of the repudiation risk, or the link between the nature of the project and the 
repudiation risk. 
 
Furthermore, traditional literature on repudiation risk and investment lending rarely deals 
with the implications of the project nature or size linkages to the overall riskiness of the 
project. In so far as repudiation risk is related to the limited liability and bankruptcy 
liquidation laws, this implies that most theoretical models of lending under moral hazard 
lead to a conclusion that costs of such risk are either evenly born by all entrepreneurs, or 
benefit small investors in excess of the large ones. However, as shown by many studies, 
see for example Groop et al (1996) and Berkowitz and White (2002), empirically such 
costs act to redistribute credit away from small entrepreneurs in favour of the larger 
projects. This empirical contradiction to theoretical models of lending under moral hazard 
risk appears to be unresolved in the modern literature. 
 
Current study is designed to fill these gaps by extending the Gertler-Rogoff-Lane 
framework to include consideration of the project contingent repudiation risk. In the 
following we assume that the importance of repudiation risk in investment decisions rests 
in part on the differences amongst various projects. For simplicity, we assume that this 
endogeneity of repudiation risk is linked to a specific characteristic of the project, namely 
its size. However, the model presented below can be easily extended to cover many 
contingencies within the realm of the project environment’s description.  
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Part 1. Model. 
 
 
There are two types of risk-neutral agents, each living two periods t  and t+1: 
entrepreneurs and lenders. Lenders are interested in maximising the expected rate of 
repayment on the project, while entrepreneurs maximise their expected utility over the 
choices of consumption and investment (assumed to be proportional to the capital outlay 
for the project), subject to budget constraint. Life-time utility is given by: 
EtU Ct ,Ct1,k  log Ct  Et logCt1  a log kt      (1) 
where in generalU , U  Ut
C  0 t1C  0, tCC,U t1CC  0and U tk  0, Utkk  0. 
 
The income available to entrepreneurs arises from two sources. Original, period t 
endowment of wealth, W , can be invested in risky project with state contingent payoffs 
described below, and the risk free asset, , yielding the gross rate of return, R. Risky 
investment technology is given as follows. At date t entrepreneur uses her own funds, 
Bt
W  Ct , together with the borrowed amount of b to finance capital formation in the 
amount of k.  This capital is then applied to the risky investment project and entrepreneur 
chooses the level of effort to be applied to the project.  The residual funds are 
automatically deposited into bond holdings.  
 
The project yields at date t+1 a return G  with probability  k  corresponding to the 
‘good’ state of nature, or a return B  with probability 1  k  corresponding to the ‘bad’ 
state of nature. We assume that 0  B G . Level of effort (capital outlay to the 
project) under the possibility of investing the borrowed funds in the risk-free asset is 
private information available to the entrepreneur but not to an investor. At date t upon 
borrowing funds for investment, entrepreneur commits to repay state-contingent rate of 
return ZG  ZB . However, investor faces an additional risk of default due to limited 
liability (repudiation). After realisation of the project, investors may expropriate only a 
share of final output. This share is project-size-contingent, so that  
 k i  Zi   i  G,B          (2) 
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We shall consider only one case:' k   0 , corresponding to the situations in which 
repudiation risk is decreasing (so that repayment share is increasing) in the size of a 
project. In a democratic society with developed media and socio-political checks and 
balances on corporate and public bureaucracy, high profile (large k) investment projects 
are associated with higher degree of visibility. The resulting reduction of information 
costs makes larger projects cheaper to monitor than smaller ones. In addition, with high 
degree of public exposure, such projects are less subject to corruption (media exposure in 
democratic setting increases cost of corruption) and therefore are associated with lower 
repudiation risk than smaller, less visible ones. This situation can warrant the 
aforementioned link between the size of the project and the repudiation risk involved. As 
was mentioned in the introduction, in case of severe corruption problems at the top of the 
government apparatus, we can specify the opposite direction of the relationship between 
the project size and repudiation risk involved. Such extension of the model would require 
reversing the sign of ' k   to ' k   0 . 
 
Given the expected rate of return to the risky investment project, we specify the inter-
temporal budget constraint as: 
Ct  Ct1R 
 k 
R
    B   B 
R
 W  b  k      (3) 
 
Denote by Z  ZG  ZB  and   G B . To control for the presence of moral hazard 
problem in terms of investment project  choice,  we impose the standard incentive  
compatibility  constraint according to which risky projects must yield at least the same 
rate of return as risk-free bonds: 
' k    Z   R          (4) 
We further assume that neither future income, nor the expected repudiation funds can be 
leveraged in the debt markets, so that 
W  b  k  Bt  Ct  0        (5) 
Furthermore, investors must be guaranteed a repayment level at least in the amount of the 
opportunity cost of risky investment, i.e. R: 
 k Z  ZB  Rb          (6) 
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 We are now ready to postulate the problems faced by entrepreneur who chooses 
consumption over two periods, capital investment, debt level, and the level of the state-
contingent repayment to offer so as to: 
max Ct ,Ct1,k,b,Z G ,ZB EtU Ct ,Ct1,kt         
subject to (1)-(6). Denote by i ,,, ,  the multipliers on constraints (2)-(6) 
respectively. Then the first order conditions for the general problem are given by: 
Ut
C  RU t1C    1Ct 
R
Ct1
        (7a) 
RU t1C    RCt1  0          (7b) 
Ut
k    '
R
  Z 1

 'Z   ' '   Z  ' GG  BB  
a
kt
  '
R
  Z 1

 ' Z   ' '   Z  ' GG BB    0
  (7c) 
    R           (7d) 
   
R



  '  G          (7e) 
1    
R



 '  B         (7f) 
 
From (7a) it is clear that we have two cases to consider: 
Case 1:  RCt  Ct1  UtC  RUt1C  which implies that   0 with (5) satisfied at  
inequality. This is a case when borrowers will hold non-zero level of 
bonds and collateral reserve, so that moral hazard applies.  
As shown below the resulting optimal level of capital allocation is below 
the full information first-best solution in Gertler-Rogoff-Lane. 
Case 2:  Ut
C  RU t1C  which implies that   0 and (5) is satisfied at equality. This 
is a case when borrowers will hold no bonds and colateral, so that moral 
hazard does not constrain the optimal level of capital available to 
borrowers. Repudiation risk alone matters. 
As shown below the resulting optimal capital allocation is determined by 
its effect on repudiation risk. 
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 Part 2. Case-Specific Solutions. 
 
2.1. Case 1: Moral Hazard in Absence of Effective Repudiation Risk.  
 
Consider Case 1. Since   0, then the optimal solution to the problem is given by the 
following equations: 
   k Z  ZB  Rb        (8a) 
MR curve b  Ct  kt W  Bt  
  B  t  0
IC curve ' k    Z   R        (8c) 
ZZ curve 
 k   
 k i   i   i  G,B       (8d) 
Equilibrium level  U tk  Ut
C
R
 ' k   R     (8e) 
    k1
*  aCtR'  R  
Comparing intercept IC with  level, k1
* k1
*  k0IC . The reason for this is that under the 
assumptions of Case 1 moral hazard applies and borrowers have to set aside a certain 
amount of reserves in form of bonds to supply collateral for the loans. This limits the 
level of capital investment that can be undertaken. However, since net return to 
borrowers after repayment of the loan is higher than the risk-free rate of return, IC 
constraint does not bind at the optimum. Hence k1
*  ˜ k , where ˜ k  denotes the solution to 
standard G-R-L problem without repudiation risk but with moral hazard. In presence of 
collateral, borrowers can guarantee higher repayment rate Z1
*  ˜ Z  than in case of G-R-L.  
Thus, lenders are compensated for the added risk by obtaining the expected returns in 
excess of risk-free rate of return. The repudiation risk does not matter in this case because 
it is effectively offset by the bond holdings, which can be repudiated under the 
assumptions of (2), (3) and (5). Figure 1 below shows these results.  
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 Figure 1. Equilibrium Levels of Capital Investment and Repayment Pledge. 
Benchmark Case of No Repudiation Risk. 
 
      Z         MR 
 
        
Z1
*  
 
˜ Z       risk-premium to lender 
 
 
 
       IC 
                   k 
       ˜ k               k  k1
*
0
IC
               
         B >0 t
Note that in this case welfare analysis conducted in Gertler (1992) fully applies. Thus 
increase in wealth endowment of entrepreneurs will shift both IC and MR curves 
rightward thereby increasing the credit availability. Alternatively increase in personal 
wealth will reduce the risk-premium required by the lenders. 
 
 
2.2. Case 2: Moral Hazard in Presence of Repudiation Risk.  
 
Next we consider Case 2. In general, assumptions for this case imply that   0, so that 
outside the bond holdings collateral reserves are zero and constraint (5) holds at equality. 
It is straightforward to show that equalities in constraints (3) and (6) will follow as well. 
Finally, simplifying (7c) we can summarise the main equations of the model as follows: 
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MR curve  k Z  ZB  Rb        (9a) 
  b  Ct  kt W  
IC curve ' k    Z   R        (9b) 
ZZ curve 
 k   
 k i   i   i  G,B       (9c) 
 
E-level  
U tk   ' k  U t1C   Z  Ut
C
R
Z

  ' '   Z  Ut
C  ' k  GG  BB  (9d) 
 As in G-R-L we can consider two cases of application of repudiation risk.  
Case 2.A.:  repudiation risk does not bind in ‘good’ state, i.e. G  0  
Case 2.B.:  repudiation risk does bind in ‘good’ state, i.e. G  0  
 
 
 
2.2.1. Case 2.1: Repudiation Risk in ‘Bad’ State Alone 
 
First suppose repudiation risk constraint does not bind in case of ‘good’ state realisation. 
This implies that  k G  G  and therefore, B  0  unambiguously. The governing 
equations are: 
MR curve  k Z   k B  R kt  Ct  W      (10a) 
IC curve ' k    Z   R        (10b) 
ZZ curve  k            (10c) 
E-level      
a
ki
*  A Z' ' ' '   Z   'B




1
Ct
   '
Ct1
A  1
RCt
 
Ct1
    (10d) 
As before, MR curve slopes up in k,Z   space, however, equation (10a) gives a flatter 
slope than corresponding equation in Case 1, since now repudiation constraint does not 
bind in ‘good’ state. In addition, MR has non-zero intercept at k0
MR .  
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Relative to ZZ curve, MR is steeper or flatter whenever ' k  , R Z ' k  k   ZB . The 
interpretation for this cut-off point on repudiation coefficient is that when capital stock 
has strong effect on repudiation risk reduction, ' k   R Z ' k  k   ZB , repudiation risk will 
matter less than moral hazard in determining borrowing opportunities available to agents. 
Marginal effect of decreasing repudiation risk being strong, lenders will now accept 
lower risk premium. The fall in incentives for borrowers to raid loan funds and deposit 
these funds into bonds (moral hazard) increases slower with raising capital, in this case, 
than their ability to repay the lenders. Hence, lenders are willing to lend more in this case 
than in case of weaker effect of capital level on repudiation risk. These differences are 
captured by relative positions of ZZ(strong) and ZZ(weak) curves vis-à-vis MR curve in 
Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Equilibrium Levels of Capital Investment and Repayment Pledge. Case of 
Repudiation Risk Accruing to Bad State. 
      MRour 
      Z           ZZ(strong)                  
 
                    ZZ(weak) 
 
 
Z2
*  
ˆ Z  
 
Z3
*  
 
                   k 
    k0
MR    k      k  3
*
2
* ˆ k            k  0
IC
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With weak effect of capital stock on repudiation risk, however, the lenders are not willing 
to supply capital in excess of the optimal amount determined by the repudiation risk 
constraint (MR curve) and lender repayment constraint (ZZ curve). Hence, solutions to 
this problem for lower effect case are given by: 
k3
*,Z3
*  k,Z  R2:k0MR  k  k2* 0  Z3*  Z2* .  
While in the benchmark case the optimal solution is: ˆ k , ˆ Z   
 
Thus there exist an optimal level of repudiation risk, determined by point  at 
which lenders are willing to supply maximum level of loans in exchange for being 
reimbursed by the borrowers with the proceeds from investment project. Borrowers will 
hold zero bonds and will invest all borrowed funds into risky project. They will ex-ante 
commit to repay exactly 
k2
*,Z2
* 
Z2
*   * k   in expected repayments which corresponds to the 
share that can be seized by lenders from the borrowers.  
 
Note that the distance between ˆ Z  and  is the exact measure of the repudiation risk 
premium required by the investors in excess of entrepreneur’s pledge of  that would 
serve to secure the highest possible level of capital raised by entrepreneur in the case 
where repudiation risk is weakly responsive to the size of investment. 
Z2
*
Z2
*
 
Comparing these results with Case 1, we have that k2
*  k1*, and k2*  ˜ k . Hence, as 
expected in presence of effective moral hazard and repudiation risk (at least in one state) 
we achieve lower capital levels than in case where repudiation risk is effectively non-
binding. 
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2.2.2. Case 2.2: Repudiation Risk in Both States. 
 
Under the assumption that G  0 , repudiation constraint binds in both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
states of nature. This implies that the solution to the problem is determined by the 
following system of equations: 
MR curve  k Z   k B  R kt  Ct  W      (11a) 
IC curve ' k  1 k    R        (11b) 
ZZ curve  k            (11c) 
Equilibrium level   k  k    k B   k E   R kt  Ct W   (11d) 
 
Once again, ZZ curve relative to MR is steeper or flatter depending on whether the effect  
of capital level on repudiation risk is strong ( k   R k  Ct W 
E   ) or weak. This is the 
same threshold value for the effect strength as in Case 2.1 above.  
 
However, comparing the point given by intersection of IC and MR curves (maximal 
solution to problem in case 2.1 given by k2
*,Z2
* ), with the solution to E-level equation 
(11d) above, it can be shown that k4
*  k2* so that in case of strong effect of repudiation 
risk the resulting level of capital expenditure will be below the levels achieved in similar 
case under the assumption that repudiation risk binds in ‘bad’ state alone. The result is 
expected. Relative to case 2.1 in present set up investors are concerned with repudiation 
risk in both states. This in return warrants higher demanded repayment pledge and 
implies lower capital expenditure.  
 
Solutions to this case are given in Figure 3. It is important to note that in this case 
investors are willing to accept lower repayment, as repudiation risk is falling in the size 
of the project, while supplying the same amount of funds (segment AB  along the E-level 
line). 
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Figure 3.  Equilibrium Levels of Capital Investment and Repayment Pledge.  
     Case of Repudiation Risk Accruing to Both States. 
 
      Z           ZZ(strong)   
    E-level 
                    MR(3) 
           ZZ(intermediate) 
    
         ZZ(weak) 
       A 
Z4
*                 
             B 
 
         IC 
 
  
            k0
MR                                   k  k5
* k4
* k2
*
1
*
 
Subsequently, as before in Case 2.1, capital and repayment levels for weaker effect of 
repudiation risk reduction are given by the following set: 
k5
*,Z5
*  k,Z  R2:k0MR  k  k4* 0  Z  Z4*  k,Z R2:k0MR  k  k2*  0 Z  Z2*  
 
Hence, overall strong link between the repudiation risk and the size of the project allows 
for the optimal level of investment and repayment pledge to reach the same position as in 
the case of non-binding repudiation risk in good state of nature. However, with weaker 
effect of project characteristics on repudiation risk, the level of investment falls at the 
optimum to , while the level of ex ante commitment pledge required to raise this 
amount rises (possibly even above the case 2.1 levels) to . The distance AB in Figure 3 
above therefore represents the risk premium required by the lenders in presence of the 
repudiation risk binding in both states. 
k4
*
Z4
*
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 Conclusions. 
 
The present study develops a comprehensive model of investments in presence of the 
investment-contingent repudiation risk and moral hazard. In departure from traditional 
literature on repudiation risk, the model presented above proposes a link between the size 
of the project and the level of repudiation risk. We assume that public information and 
scrutiny that accompany large-scale investment projects act to reduce the risk of 
repudiation in the model. Using as the foundation the model of Gertler and Rogoff, we 
treat as a benchmark the case of no repudiation risk. Extending Lane (1998, 1999) 
analysis of the repudiation risk in Gertler and Rogoff model to include consideration of 
the investment project size effect on repudiation risk, we consider two main cases:  
 case 1 corresponding to the situation where project-contingent repudiation risk 
applies only in the bad state of nature, and 
  case 2 where repudiation risk enters both good and bad states of nature. 
 
Comparing the cases outlined above with the benchmark model, we show that in case of 
repudiation risk applicable to the bad state of nature alone, when marginal benefits of 
reducing repudiation risk are high, borrowers are able to leverage the potential 
expropriation funds. Incentives to raid the loan funds fall slower than the ability of 
borrowers to repay the loan. Hence, lenders are willing to lend more the stronger the 
effect of capital size on repudiation risk. With weak effect of capital stock on repudiation 
risk, however, the lenders are not willing to supply capital in excess of the optimal 
amount determined by the repudiation risk constraint and lender repayment constraint.  
 
Overall, there exist an optimal level of repudiation risk, determined by point at which 
lenders are willing to supply maximum level of loans in exchange for being reimbursed 
by the borrowers with the proceeds from investment project. Borrowers will hold zero 
bonds and will invest all borrowed funds into risky project. They will ex-ante commit to 
repay exactly the share that can be seized by lenders from the borrowers. Comparing 
these results with benchmark no repudiation risk case, we have that optimal levels of 
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capital investments are lower in presence of repudiation risk. Hence, as expected in 
presence of effective moral hazard and repudiation risk (at least in one state) we achieve 
lower capital levels than in case where repudiation risk is effectively non-binding.  
 
The second case covers the environment in which the repudiation risk applies to both 
states of nature. In this case we show that optimal level of capital investments is lower 
overall. In case of strong effect of repudiation risk the resulting level of capital 
expenditure will be below the levels achieved in similar case under the assumption that 
repudiation risk binds in ‘bad’ state alone. The result is expected. Relative to the first 
case where repudiation risk applies in bad state of nature, in the second case investors are 
concerned with repudiation risk in both states. Such increase in overall uncertainty 
warrants higher demanded repayment pledge and implies lower capital expenditure. It is 
important to note that in this case investors are willing to accept lower repayment as 
repudiation risk is falling while supply the same amount of funds. 
 
However in both cases whenever repudiation risk links to the size of the project outlay of 
capital are strong, entrepreneurs are able to raise funding at the levels approaching those 
in the benchmark model. 
 
Thus, overall the model supplies intuitively plausible predictions that a stronger linkage 
between repudiation risk and investment levels will have a stronger effect on the required 
rate of return in order to provide incentives for the investors to supply the required 
capital. Repudiation risk consideration magnifies the overall negative effects of moral 
hazard. The project-contingent nature of repudiation risk in our case relaxes the overall 
repudiation risk, since both the lenders and the borrowers are aware of the positive effects 
of the project size on the level of risk. Thus we can expect that, ceteris paribus, large 
projects will obtain more readily available financing, while smaller projects will require 
higher pledge or collateral funding from the entrepreneur in order to secure a loan. 
 
These results lend a natural means to account for the puzzling empirical effects of the 
limited liability and bankruptcy liquidation clauses mentioned in the introduction. The 
 15 
puzzle arises in so far as traditional theoretical models of lending in presence of moral 
hazard imply the reverse effects of limited liability on the ability of the entrepreneurs to 
raise credit relative to the size of the projects. In our model large projects are favoured by 
investors due to the link between the size of the project and the level of the repudiation 
risk. The smaller (less wealthy) entrepreneurs and projects are less likely to benefit from 
the repudiation risk linkage. This implies that in so far as limited liability and bankruptcy 
liquidation clauses have the same effect on lowering the expected ability of entrepreneurs 
to repay the lenders in case of bad outcome, it is the larger investors who have greater 
access to the credit markets. Thus our model confirms the empirical regularities observed 
in the literature. 
 
In so far as the present study offers a way of endogenising the repudiation risk by linking 
the level of risk with the characteristic of the project itself, the model presented above 
offers an interesting case for the future empirical analysis.  
 
Firstly, it confirms the general hypothesis that democratic institutions of checks and 
balances can act in asymmetric fashion on the degree of repudiation risk. With large 
investment project being subject to the greater scrutiny in local and international media, 
costs of monitoring the project development and the threat of potential public exposure of 
the loan raiding entrepreneurs act to ameliorate the repudiation risk and lower the 
requirements on repayment pledge and collateral.  
 
Secondly, the study develops an explicit relationship between the testable hypotheses 
concerning the observable environment and the ex ante analysis of the potential 
investment projects.  
 
Thirdly, we show that the model can be easily interpreted in the context of the force 
majeur repudiation risk (bad state only case) and the general repudiation risk. Both types 
can be separated within the constraints of the model and the effects of their differences 
can be traced back to the ability of the entrepreneurs to raise funds. Of even greater 
importance is the fact that the size of the project under the assumptions of the democratic 
 16 
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market-driven institutions, can be intrinsically linked to these differences as well. While 
force majeur causes may apply to the repudiation raid whereby in the bad state of nature, 
especially when such bad state is macroeconomic (down cycle, country-wide shock, etc) 
even in democratic market-oriented societies, the general repudiation risk most certainly 
meets no approval from the general electorate. Thus the external environment differences 
between these two forms of repudiation risk must be kept clearly distinguished in any 
model of investment under uncertainty with the possibility of capital funds expropriation. 
Our model satisfies this criterion.  
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